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ABSTRACT 
This paper gives an account of how the import licensing system 
in Kenya has developed up to and including the introduction of foreign 
exchange allocation licensing in December, 1972. 
This means by which different categories of imports are treated 
by the authorities are outlined and the theoretical implications of import 
restrictions discussed. It is postulated that import licensing is the 
major means of protecting local manufacturers in Kenya, So the appendix 
tables indicate the import licensing system has evolved to cover a large 
proportion of imparts entering Kenya. 
The paper is primarily descriptive and contains no results 
of empirical work related to this topic. 
/ 
/ 
D.S. MacRae. 
The import licensing system as it exists- today is 
part of a complex army of controls and restrictions which has 
evolved over the last ten years. Until recently, when the adminis-
tration of the system was drastically revised, imports entered 
Kenya either freely under Open General Licence (O.G.L.) or 
required a Specific Import Licence from the Department of Trade 
and Supplies at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
The 1P62 Imports, Exports and Essential Supplies Act 
(Laws of Kenya, Chapter 502) lays the legal foundations of the 
system although import controls were an essential feature of 
trade; policy throughout the colonial period. The Act gave the 
Governor the power to appoint a Director of Trade and Supplies, 
a Deputy Director of Trade and Supplies and so many assistants 
as he may deem necessary in order to supervise the system, 
The Director was to be given the freedom to delegate his powers, 
duties or functions but it was left to the Minister to decide 
which commodities were to be affected and in what way and these 
power's were non delragatable.^ ^  
The Act also gave the authorities the power to require 
returns, to enter and search premises under warrant and powers 
of entry and seizurr?. Contravention of the Act made the offender 
liable to a fine not exceeding 10,000 shs or imprisonment for up 
to two years., It was left to the absolute discretion of the 
Director to either grant or refuse to grant a licence for the 
importation of goods falling within the powers of the Act and 
he was also given the freedom to vary or cancel the terms of 
any licence already granted and to restrict their transfer. 
Section 4(lJ of the Act expresses the Winter's role formally: 
"Whenever from time to time it appears to the Minister, 
after consultation with such persons as appear to the Minister 
to represent commercial and industrial interests in Kenya, 
to be necessary in the public interest or for the observance 
or performance by the Government of any'of its obligations 
in respect of external affairs so to do, he may by order 
either prohibit absolutely or restrict, by means of such 
conditions and limitations as may be specified in the order, 
the exnortation or importation of all or any specified gpods 
or class or description of goods either generally or to or from 
any specified person or class of persons: Provided that the 
Minister may dispense with such consultation as aforesaid in an 
case which appears to him to be too urgent to permit of such 
consultation. 
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Importers were given the right to appeal to the Minister against 
the decisions of the Director and in such cases the Minister's 
decision was final. 
This Act, although periodically modified, has never 
been revoked, and is the legal basis of the control of goods 
by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Every import licence 
must specify the names of both the receiver and sender of the 
imported items and the conditions and limitations placed on the 
importation. 
In the 1S62 Act the items which were to be affected 
by licensing were organised under three schedules. The first 
schedule consisted of a list of fourteen countries^~J the importa-
tion of goods originating in or exported from which was prohibited 
except under and in accordance with a licence granted under, 
the Act Eleven of these were members of the Socialist Elock, 
plus Japan, Iran and Iraq. 
The second schedule contains a number of items, 
listed by their SITC codes, which would in future only be 
imported under licence, A large proportion of these were foodstuffs. 
The list also.included salt, animal and vegetable oils, shoe 
polish, sacks, cement, jewellery, matches and gold. 
The Third Schedule also contains a collection of 
items listed by SITC codes and in these cases specifies the 
countries of origin from which these items would in future.be 
restricted. Imports from Japan of bicycle tyres and tubes, cement, 
clothing and footwear were included plus imports from all countries 
of sorghum, beans and shoe polish. These were the only items 
from Tanzania and Uganda to come under the terms of the Act. • i 
All other imports from Partner states and commodities not 
included under any of the three schedules were permitted to 
enter Kenya under an Open General Licence subject to such conditions 
as the Director would from time to time impose. It was also I ; 
left to the discretion of the Director to decide upon the degree 
of alteration necessary for a good to have received in a particular 
country for it to be deemed as originating from that country. 
This was to prevent, say, Japanese clothing imports from entering 
via a third country under the guise of having been produced there 
rather than in their country of manufacture. 
p 
i.e.,: Albaria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
IW), Iraq, Japan, North Korea, North Vietnam, Poland, Rommania, 
The Copies Republic of China. The USSR. Iran and Iraq were deleted 
in 19S«m 
The changing coverage of the licensing system 
through the years is recorded in a series of legal notices 
published in the Gazette. Changes have been frequent and of 
varying significance. As might be expected a fundamental change 
followed independence in 1964^ when the coverage and purpose 
of the system were revised, More than fiften per cent of the net 
home consumption would have been affected in 1964 had the 
revision occurred at the beginning of that year. A number 
of manufactured items were added,fuels and lubricants 
were included for the first time,1; and the numbers of foodstuffs 
increased. 
During colonial times the system was primarily 
regulatory: to keep a check on what was coming into the country, 
and to direct trade in what were considered to be desirable 
directions. Following independence regulation continued to be a 
function and the system was also involved in the-execution of 
discriminatory trade policies, (e.g., the restrictions on imports 
from Japan in order to correct an adverse trade balance with that 
country). But in addition the desire to industralize gave 
the system a protective role so much so that today virtually 
every item that is locally manufactured is imparted, if at nil, 
then under licence. 
The schedules' under which items have been organised 
for treatment have changed since the 19G2 Act. From 1964 to 
1972 affected commodities were-organised under three schedules. 
Items appearing under the First schedule were only to be imported 
from places other than Uganda and. Tanzania under and in accordance 
with an import licence. These appearing under the Second 
Schedule required a licence wherever they originated. These 
under the Third Schedule required licences if imported from 
Tanzania and Uganda otherwise than by ovjza the order of the 
Kenya National Tradipig Corporation-" (KNTC), 
' ! . * ' The second substantial increase in the number of i 
commodities falling within the licencing system occurred in 
1 November 1968 . Looking only at the effect on external trade, 
, -1 
at least thirty five'per cent by value of net home consumption 
would have been affected had the extended controls been operative 
from the beginning of the year. 
" Legal Notice No.341 of 2nd November 1934! 
' Legal Notice No. 346/26th November 1968. 
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Appendix A lists the externally traded items, 
according to their six digit S.I.T.C. codings, which have been 
affected by licensing through the years 196? to 1972. S.I.T.C. 
Section four and nine (animal and vegetable oils, and commodities 
not classified according to kind) are the only sections not to have 
experienced a general increase in the numbers of items affected 
through the years. The progressive rise in the number.of items 
under licence is particularly noticeable in Section six, and to 
a lesser extent in Section eight (i.e., manufactured goods). 
Most of the imports from Partner States which require 
licences pass through the K.N.T.C, The Kenya National Trading 
Corporation was established in 1955 as a subsidiary of the Industrial 
and Commercial Development Corporation (l.C.D.C.) with the main 
purpose of promoting the specialization of commerce. Confinement 
of products to it applies in principle to both imported and 
locally produced goods but in practice it has proved difficult 
to enforce this with respect to locally produced goods. 
Some of the products confined to K.N.T.C. can only be handled 
by citizen traders. In addition the K.N.T.C, is free to handle 
items not legally confined to it. It buys certain items such 
as sugar and cement which are then sold to wholesalers who aro 
appointed distributors for K.N.T.C. products. About sixty 
percent of K.N.T.C. turnover is in. these products. For the 
remaining products the K,N,T ,C. appoints agents who are respon-
sible for the importation and sale of these goods and pay a 
commission to the K.N.T.C, for the privilege.1 
Appendix B gives estimates of the proportions of 
net home consumption affected by specific import licensing in i 
value terms for each year from the schemes, inception in 1962 
* \ ' i 
to the end of 1971. These are only approximate. Estimates of 
the fractions of certain six digit groupings have been made where 
the legal notices specified only a part of the total and the net 
home consumption' totals are calculated as if all the legislation -' 
enacted during a year was in operation from the beginning. 
For a full discussion of K.N.T.C. and its sister bodies 
in Partner States see D.P. Ghai: "State Trading and 
Regional Economic Integration: the East'African Experience". 
I.D.S. Discussion Paper No.145. 
V . !• 
It could -be-argued-that one 'would have a truer 
reflection of reality by including for a particular year items 
brought into the system only up to the start of the year especially 
in view of the lag between the official legal declaration of a control 
and its subsequent enforcement. Thus the percentages are a 
systematic overstatement of the true situation, A further 
criticism of the calculations could be made which is an inherent 
weakness in the drawing up of tradfe statististics according to the 
_ 'i 
S.I.T.C. directions. Six digit S.I.T.C. groups also contain 
imports of components for the made up manufactured items listed 
as being included in the groups. Motor vehicle batteries, S.T.C. 
code 729 121 are imported on the approval of local manufacturers. 
Many are barred but this does not extend to their components 
which are used by the manufacturers themselves and imported freely. 
Thus the estimated totals will overstate'the extent of the measures 
V 
even further. ' 
Despite these criticisms the summary tables do serve 
to indicate the broad extent of the system, 1968 is the peak 
year in percentage value terms for net home consumption affected 
by import licensing. The figure declines thereafter from 
around down to around 19/c for 1971, Sections four and nine 
(animal and vegetable oils and miscellaneous manufactures) 
are the only classes of goods not to have experienced 
a general increase in the numbers of item affected through the 
years. The tendency has been for an item once placed on a schedule 
to stay there. . The progressive rise in the numbers of items 
under^licence and the value of net home consumption affected is 
particularly noticeable for manufactured goods in section six and 
to a lesser extent in section eight. 
Total net home consumption grew speadily from 1962 to 
1969 from around K£ 63 million to K£ 96 million. In the following 
\ \ r 
two years it shot up to K£ 154 million. During this time the 
proportion of the total imports licensed declined in value terms. 
It would be \vrohq to conclude from this that licensing was itself I s ' I 
responsible fbr this. Items selected for licensing are 
characteristically^produced domestically and local production of \ 
these items could well have increased independently erf' licence 
protection. Secondly, the total demand for licensed items 'mgy 
not have grown as fast as for imported items as a whole. ^ 
The incidence of licensing on net home consumption 
\ * 
* 
> i i i 
is biased away from imports of intermediate goods which are not 
produced locally. This is indicated in the section tables of 
Appendix B with only small estimated percentage value totals 
for sections two, five and seven. Imports of foodstuffs have 
been affected to a substantial degree as have fuels since the 
Mombasa refinery came.on streami The incidence of licensing 
in. sections one, four, six and eight regulates the inflow of goods 
which are potentially competitive with locally" produced goods. 
The prime function of the licensing system has 
been to protect local industries. The direction of certain 
categories of imports through the K.N.T.C. is in accordance with 
a secondary function; namely to assist in the Africanization 
of the import trade. The licensing officers do not themselves 
discriminate in favour of Africans in the granting of licences 
and in certain cases the means by which licences are allocated 
would tend to work the other way. It is left to the K.N.T.C. 
to carry out the Africanization policies of Government. 
A major reason for primary producing countries 
to industrialize is the desire to reduce the demand for foreign 
exchange to pay for imports of consumption goods. In this way 
it is hoped to release foreign exchange for the development effort. 
The way in which many developing countries have tried to do this 
has led to inward looking industrial sectors unable to survive 
without continued protection. Import substitution policies 
hove been extensively criticised elsewhere and there seems little 
need to go over the familiar ground here. 
It has been suggested that the conservation of 
foreign exchange has recently become a function of the licensing 
system. In a,sense this has been true all along in so far as it important 
JilS L tool for promoting import substitution. Wherever 
domestic production can be seen to replace imports then there is 
2 
a foreign exchange saving at least in the first round But foreign 
exchange conservation is not a consideration of the licensing 
administration but of Exchange Control at the Central Bank. 
In recent years the way in which items have become 
subject to specific, import licensing is as follows. The Director 
e.g., the seven country studies summarised in Little Scitovsky 
and Scott: "Industry and trade in some developing countries". OELD 
Development Centre 1970. John H. Power: "Protection in industria-
lization policy with particular reference to Kenya". East African 
Fconomic Review Vol.4 No.l June 1972. 
i.e.,' neglecting the possibility of negative value added and 
disruptive inter-industry effects. 
of Industry at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry receives 
and carries out the initial investigations of applications 
for protection from manufacturers of particular items.- Worthy 
cases are then referred by him to the Industrial Protection 
Committee which decides whether licence protection is to be 
given. The committee consists of representatives of the various 
ministries (Agriculture, Finance and Pleanning. Commerce and 
Industry etc.) and people sitting in an advisory capacity. 
Their job is to assess the full implications of protecting a 
particular sector on the economy as a whole. They also issue 
instructions as to the exact nature of the restriction to be 
applied by the licencing officers on the items described. 
The Director of Trade and Supplies supervises the carrying out 
of these instructions and applications for specific import licences 
are processed by the import licensing officers who work under 
him. 
I . 
Licensing Restrictions on Imports. 
Much of what fellows in this section is a summary 
of the procedures, which the Department, of Trade and Supplies 
adopts 'towards imports which require specific import licences. 
These are laid down in the import procedures file which was issued 
in December, 1971 for the use of licensing officers. Most of 
these restrictions were operative before then but not necessarily 
at the levels prescribed. Since ther the most important change has 
been the quota restrictions on those items falling under schedule C 
in• accordance with the directive from the Central Bank. In some 
cases these items were already subjec to more stringent restriction 
in which case Exchange Control Circuits No.1/1972 makes no 
difference, 
/ Applications of import licences are treated in five 
"basic ways: price range restrictiins, quantitative restx-ictions, 
' reference to specific bodies, referepe to the K.N.T.C, and 
outright bans. A particular item my be subject to more than 
one form'of restriction at the same :ime. 
Price range restriction are common on manufactured 
items. Soaps, bicycle tyres and Ubes, textiles, tableware, 
razor blades, radios, clothing and^ootwear are the- main areas 
affected. 
a -
In each of these cases imports are only allowed in if unit 
prices exceed a specified level* They effectively grant 
absolute protection to local manufactures from directly competing 
goods if the threshold price is set correctly, In several cases 
a price range restriction is combined with a quantitative 
restriction relating to import performance in some base period e.g., 
razor blades where imports are permitted at twenty five percent 
of the 196.5 level when their price is over thirty shillings per one 
hundred, and vests, singlets and tee shirts which are price 
range restricted with imports not exceeding seventy five percent 
of the 1964 level. 
Certain items are referred to specified bodies before 
an. import licence is granted. The Ministry of Agriculture must 
approve imports of millet and grain sorghum (STTC code 045901). 
cereals n.e.a, (a45909), prepared animal feeds, oranges, jams, 
beans, garlic, frozen vegetables and fertilisers. Import licences 
for paints are issued on the recommendation of the Association of 
Local Manufacturers, as also, are motor vehicle batteries; licences 
for importing jute and sisal bags and sacks are issued on the approval 
of the Jute Controller. In most cases this is to confirm whether 
local supplies are available in which case licence applications 
are' refused, Some importers are granted a monopoly outright e.g., 
impart licences for iron end steel wire are issued to the Kenya 
Industrial Estates only. 
The fourth method of treatment of licence applications 
is to confine the issue of licences only to the K.N.T.C. 
This applies to a whole range of types of commodities which includes 
a large proportion by value of the import bill. 4 b y value 
of imports of foodstuffs passed .through K.N.T.C, in 1971 2QF/o of 
imports of manufactured classified chiefly by material and a further 
7:Jc of total miscellaneous manufactures. In total the licensing 
system directed .Sfy' of net imports through K.N.T.C, in 1971, 
In certain cas^s the procedures file gives details of the way 
in which a particular item passing through the K.N.T.C. is to 
be treated, jSome are subject to quotas, others to price range 
restrictions'. This is the case with many textile goods. In many 
cases no instruction to K.N.T.C, is given. Beverages, salt, iron 
sheets, bicycles, lamps and torches fall in this category. 
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Finally a licence application may be refused outright. 
This applies to many foodstuffs and selected manufactured articles 
characteristically produced by the Kenya Industrial Estates. 
Recent Developments. 
Since January 197? the restriction on the importation of 
certain classes of goods has been designed with an eye to 
concerning foreign exchange. At that time the measures taken 
were intended to be of a temporary nature in response to the 
dwindling of foreign exchange reserves which were understood to 
be a direct result of over importation"'". 
Towards the end of 1971 the level of reserves was 
approaching a desperately low level. The visible balance 
on external trade deteriorated from an annual deficit of around 
the K£ 50 million mark, which had persisted from 1966 to 1969 
and worsened to K£ 65 million in 1970, to an all time high 
of K£ 105.8 million for 1971. Government as well as commercial 
imports contributed to this. Table I shows the percentage 
increase in government imports for the last three quarter of 
1971 over those of the preceding year to be consistently higher 
than the increase in imports of commercial goods, 
although 
in absolute terms the increase in imports of commercial goods is of 
course much greater. The small rise in the surplus on interv 
territorial•trade of K£ 2.5 million, to K£ 18 million in total, 
did little to offset the huge deficit. 
TABLE I. 
11 i 4 1970 1971 1972 71/70$ 72/71% 
1 29071 39902 45191 +37.3 +13.3 
Commercial 2 34538 41202 38277 +19.0 - 7.1 
Imports n 31133 41558 34-233 +33.8 -17.8 
4 31326 39790 +27.0 
1 5365 5453 4268 -14.3 -21.7 
Government 2 3077 3930 3502 +27.7 -10.9 
Imports 3 2094 5388 4377 +157.3 -18.3' 
\ l 
3973 6535 +64.5 
see Daily Nation 19.1.72, The Minister for Finance & 
Planning in reported as saying that the recent international 
monetary crisis was the main cause of the present•restrictions. 
Recent currency changes had-led to uncertainty among local 
traders and speculative importations. 
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During 1971 the prices for imports into Kenya as a whole 
rose by 9.9J& while export prices fell by 3.8P/c . Unfavourable terms 
of trade are an important feature of the scculcir deterioration in 
Kenya's balance of trade position but the build up in the level 
of stocks of imported commodities was a particularly important 
element in the running down of the level of reserves which occurred 
i 
towards the end of the year. In table II those principal item • 
in Kenya's import bill which show the most spectacular increases 
in imports during 1971 over recent years are listed. The percentage 
increases in volume have been included to indicate those items 
where 
inflation as well as increased import demands may have been 
important. 
TABLE II 1971 High Growth Imports. 
Item 1971 imports KE'OOO % Value °/0 Volume 
distilled alcoholic beverages 795 81.9 13.6 
total inedible crude materials 4487 77.4 n.a. 
593 95.2 92.9 
jute 874 275.1 65.1 
lubricating oils and greases 1881 110.5 71.0 
total oils and fats • 3557 151.0 n.a. 
animal oils and fats 1°29 220.9 123.0 
vegetable oils.and fats 186? 121.9 72.9 
processed oils, fats & waxes 435 139.0 56.4 
total chemicals 18415 76,1 n.a. 
synthetic plastic materials 2315 138.4 . 156.9 
J 4. u M'V-types and tubes , •. •" , bicycles 2805 99.5 
59.8 
-17.4 
total paper and paperboard:manuf. 7?10 68.4 49.5 
total, iron steel 11311 86.2 60.3 
nails, nuts, rivets, screws etc. 400 74.7 16.2 
mechanical and other hand tools 1029 I 130 n.a. 
locksmiths ware 819v 104.2 n.a. i , metal containers 729 93.9 74.8 
total all manufacturer classified by 
material 45179 58.2 n.a. 
total machinery & transport equipment 64787 53.3 67.7 
electric power machinery &•. switchgear 2542 151.0 82.2 
tractors 2l84 67.4 0.2 
pass'enqer motor cars complete 5557 48.9 35.4 
1' Figures derived from Kenya Statistical Digest estimates. 
TABLE II (cont'd). - XJ. -
Item • 1971 imports K£'000 # Value, °/d Volume 
buses trucks carrier etc. complete 4014 99.4 83.9 
chassis with engines mounted 5020 124.4 88.9 
total miscellaneous manufactures 17114 113.1 n.a. 
furniture & fixtures 666 152.2 n.a. 
clothing 3423 164.1 n.a. 
footwear 605 123.2 97.9 
books and pamphlets 1284 223.4 n.a. 
total net imports 184105 63.3 43.4 
The percentage value and volume columns in table II mea-
sures the percentage increases in imports for 1971 over the 
average imports for 1967, 1968 and 1959, 
It will be seen that imports of distilled alcoholic 
beverages, nails etc., tractors and motor cars increased less 
in volume terms than for imports as a whole, Inflation was 
particularly important in accounting for the increased imports of 
distilled alcoholic benerages, jute, animal oils and fats, nails 
etc., electrical machinery and tractors. 
The Central Bank issued a circular to all banks 
(Exchange Control circular No.l 1972) which detailed the regulations 
which would in future apply to all those categories of imports 
for which foreign exchange would in future be restricted irrespective 
of whether the import had previously been subject to the r-ecuirements 
cf specific import licensing (i.e., involved in the licensing 
system at that time) or open general licence* 
E C 1/72 outlines the procedure to be adopted in 
the case of imports of items listed under five schedules towards the 
end of the circular. Schedules A, B and C contain items which were 
already subject to specific import licensing while schedules D 
and E list items which were previously allowed entry under open 
general licence. Items were listed according to how necessary 
it was considered that their importation should continue, ! h u s 
schedules B and E contain import items for which foreign exchange 
would in future not be provided; payment in foreign exchange for 
schedule C items would only be authorised by commercial banks when 
particular prior exchange control approval had been granted; the 
banks would be allowed to continue to authorise payment for 
Schedule A items subject to the provisions of administrative 
notices and instructions; Schedule 0 items would reouire a 
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"no objection to foreign exchange" certificate for which application 
could be made to the Director of Trade and Supplies. 
E C 1/72 does not revise the licensing systems 
protective role. What it does is to classify a large proportion 
of the import bill on the basis of the extent to which particular 
items can be dispersed with in order to consume foreign exchange. 
Thus there is a substantial overlap since protected local 
manufacturing is looked to to make good the reduced supplies of 
certain goods following the imposition of restrictions. 
Appendix C contains estimates of the extent of the 
e:'.change control circular. The estimates of values of net home 
consumotion affected by the different schedules are subject to the 
same weaknesses as mentioned earlier regarding Appendix B. 
The tables indicate what would be the affected percentage of net 
home consumption if the schedules were applied to 1971 NHC 
values. From table II of Appendix C it will be seen that Section 0 
(foodstuffs) contains the most banned items in value terms 
(over 23/°) followed by Section 8 (miscellaneous manufactures) 
with 8.75/'= although this figure will contain components and 
should be reduced somewhat. Over 12°/o of the import bill will 
be subject to licence quotas and more than 3fo of net home 
consumption previously entering under 0 G L will be regulated 
by foreign exchange allocation licences. The five schedules 
affect more than half the net home consumption of foodstuffs and 
miscellaneous manufactures almost half of manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by material and almost all beverages. 
From January 1972 it is important to realise the 
dual character of the licensing system. It ceases to be 
the province solely of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
since the Central Bank must also consider applications. 
Schedule A items are listed for protective reasons, 
Schedule D and E items to conserve foreign exchange, while 
Schedules B and C are designed to both protect and conserve. 
Schedule C and D items are subject to quota 
restrictions. For Schedule • C items specific import licences 
would be issued by the Director of Trade and Supplies based on a 
quarterly quote which would relate to part performance. Specific 
licences would detail tha S I T C code number and stipulate 
the shipment was to be effected within four months of the date 
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of issue Importers would be recruired~ta ~submiiL_alJLtbe-necessary" 
evidence (including customs entries) of 1970 and 1971 imports 
under each S I T C code number to the Director of Trade and 
Supplies. For 1972 the procedure to be adopted was for an announce-
ment to be made of the total value of imports of a commodity 
which would be permitted and for importers to apply for licences 
to the Director of Trade and Supplies initially to cover the first 
quarter of 1972. The application had to be accompanied by at 
least two copies of the indent or suppliers proforma invoice 
with the name and branch of the applicants bank inserted. 
The Director of Trade and Supplies would then forward to the 
Central Bank Exchange Control Office for approval of the requisite 
foreign exchange the copies of the indent or invoice showing the 
licence issued and the approximate Kenya currency equivalent of 
foreign exchange required based on the rate of exchange at the date 
of approval. If the issue of a foreign exchange allocation 
licence was approved, the licence in duplicate together with two 
indents or suppliers invoice, one evidencing the issue of a 
specific import licence and the other duly stamped "for exchange 
control purposes only" were returned to the Director of Trade 
& Supplies for issue to the applicant. 
During 1972 Schedule C items have been treated in 
the followingway, For each individual importer his average 
annual importation during the years 1970 E- 1971 was calculated. 
If this amounted to less than 20000 shs. this amount of foreign 
exchange was relased for 1972 in one instalment. For average -
annual importations of more than 20,000 shs only half of this amount 
was released for the first six months.. Importers would then 
reapply for their second—allocation. Until recently this would 
have been the sarrr as the first so that the total average-annual 
import for 1970-71 was granted for 1972 in full. It is intended-
to reduce many of the quota allocations in the near future and 
so recently second instalment applicant's have--received only 29$ 
of the 1970-71 average annual importation making a total allocation 
for the.period March 1972 to March 1973 of only 75;/: of the 1970-/1 
avereg-fe, 
'//here quotas are .related to past performance in this 
way the degree of restrictiveness will vary between items. 
If imports 'show a steady upward trend through time the effect 
of the restriction will be' greater than if imports are already 
falling anb being replaced by domestic production. In this case 
it is possible-that the restrictions present no effective 
- 14 -
constraint to importers-at all. 
Payments for the imports of schedule D item were 
also made subject to the issue cf an exchange control allocation 
licence related to an individual importers past performance under 
each category during 1970-71 before the importer places a firm 
order. Ely the same method as for schedule 0 items' importers 
are required to submit the necessary evidence of 1970—71 imports 
and when individual quotas for 197? had been established an 
announcement would' be made and importers invited to apply to the 
Director of Trade and Supplies for a certificate of"no objection 
to foreign exchange" to cover the first quarter of 1972. 
This indicates the S I T C code number and stipulates shipment 
within four months from the date of issue.Imports of Schedule D 
items are intended to be regulated so as to avoid speculative 
build ups of stocks by rationing foreign exchange to importers 
with no actual reduction in the absolute amount. The items 
listed under this heading were thought to be particularly prone 
to this. 
It was expected that the exchange control measures 
would result in a foreign exchange saving of about K£ 10 million 
annually which amounts to around 5fn of 1971 imports. This saving 
would have to be made on mainly Schedule 0 and E items since 
most of Schedule B items were already prohibited imports. 
According to a ministerial announcement the measures 
taken were not to be regarded as a permanent feature of the economy. 
They were designed to correct inbalances that had occurred 
arid once that correction had been achieved they would be eased." 
The schedules have remained intact however as part of the most 
recent scheme for regulating the release of foreign exchange. 
Early indications of the reduction in imports are 
apparent in the quarterly trade figures for total and selected 
imports already available for 1972. Table III gives the percentage 
changes in imports on the previous year for a few selected commoditie 
It shows total imports declining from the second quarter and quite 
marked reversals for motor vehicles and chassis, agricultural 
machinery and tractors and paper and paper products, 
Reported on East African Report on Trade & Industry 
p.9 December, 1971. 
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Table IV tabulates the foreign exchange reserves of the 
Central Bank on a monthly basis. The level of reserves 
begins to fall from July 1971 and although improving towards 
the end of 1972 had still not regained its 1970 level. 
Until the Annual Trade Report for 1972 is released it is 
impossible" (and even then difficult) to know' to what extent: 
the reduction 'in import levels results from the January 1972 
.restrictions and how muchf would have -happened anyway as traders 
began to run down already imported stocks. Some of the imports 
could have been an anticipatory response to EE.1/72 itself. 
TABLE III Quarterly Imports (K£ '000) and changes. 
4- 5 4 j 1970 1971 | 1972 71/70°/' 72/ 
net 1 j 35435 45355 - 49458 +28.0 +9. 1 
imports 2 37714 . 45133 41798 +19.7 -7. 4 
total 3 33227 47045 38510 +41.6 -17. 9 
4 35299 46325 n.a. +31.2 
1 2213 2945 2377 +33.1 -19. 3 
Iron and o 2225 2988 2045 +34.2 -31. G 
Steel 3 2160 2702 2944 +25.1 + 9. 0 
a 2405 2675 +11.2 
motor J 2675 4069 4792 +52.1 +17. 8 
vehicles and 2 3033 3950 3158 +30.5 -20. 2 
chasis 3 3127 4865 2650 ' +55.6 -45. 5 
4 2638 4273 +62.0 
agricultural 1 571 597 1278 + 4.5 +114. 1 
machinery 2 734 589 885 -19.8 +50. 4 
and tractors 3 502 1138 323 ; +89.0 -71. 6 
4 495 652 +31,7 
industrial 1 •5688 6734 8907 +18.4 +32 .3 
including 2 5768 . 7825 . 7725 +35.7 -1 .3' 
electrical 3 5325 7516 6499 +41.2 -13 .5 
machinery 4 5632 7968 +41.5 
TABLE III (Cont'd). 
4 4 1970 1971 1972 71/70$ 72/73$ 
paper and 
paper 
products 
1. 1 
2 
3 
4 
1357 
1817 
1413 
2061 
2064 
2212 
2098 
2038 .. 
• 2038 
1730 
1582-
+52.1 
' +21.7 
+48.5 
-1.1 
-1,3 ' ' 
-21.8 
-24.5 
TABLE IV Level of foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank. 
Month 
J 
F 
M 
A 
M 
J 
J 
A 
S 
0 
N 
D 
1970 K£m. 
5Q.0 ' 
54.3 
55.9 
68.7 
57.4 
66.9 
58.5 
59.3 
70.5 
72.3 
73.5 
73.5 
1971 K£m. 1972 KEm. 
75.5 
75.0 
77.8 
71.5 
72.3 
67.1 
63.0 
63.6 
57.5 
57.5 
55.7 
55.2 
57.1 
56.8 
60.3 
52.1 
58.5 
55.1 
58.3 
58.8 
61.4 
53.4 Source: 
62.4 Kenya St tistic 
Digest . 
-i 
On 1st December, 1972 E.C. 24/72 was released by 
the Central Bank. This circular outlines a quite drastic .increase 
in the extent of import controls deemed necessary in the interests 
t 
of foreign exchange conservation, All imports into Kenya in excess 
of an invoice value of two thousand shillings including-' items 
under Cj G L and imports by oil companies are henceforth subject 
to foreign exchange licensing. / 
It was felt that overinvoicing was making such a 
significant contribution to the drain on the foreign exchange 
reserves as to warrant remedial action, ' With the exception of 
certain categories of imports and items, covered by transitional 
arrangements, all imports in excess of an invoice value of 
twenty thousand shillings on and after the 1st January 1973 
were, to be subject to preshipment quality and quantity inspection 
and price comparison on behalf of and for account of the Central 
Bank of Kenya by General Superintendence Co.Ltd. (Societe 
Generale de Surveillance) or its representatives.Banks were 
required to bring the revised regulations to the notice of their 
importing customers who in turn would advise overseas sellers 
of the new requirements. 
The lists of item under the five schedules (A to E) of 
the January circular are maintained intact only the treatment 
of the different items is altered. Schedule A import items 
remain subject to specific import licensing by the Director of 
Trade and Supplies and will be granted foreign exchange allocation 
licences automatically. Schedule C items also remain subject 
to specific import licensing for which foreign exchange will be 
provided on a quota basis. Schedule D items are not subject 
t£> specific import licensing but require a "no objection to 
foreign exchange" certificate from the Director of Trade and 
Supplies, Foreign exchange vail be provided on a auota basis. 
/\1\ categories of imports under 0 G L not listed on schedules 
D and E will be provided automatically with a foreign exchange 
allocation licence. 
•Foreign exchange allocation licences issued by the 
Central Bank of Kenya, Exchange Control are required for all 
import^ except for certain specified exceptions.^ Imports 
were required to apply for foreign exchange allocation licences 
before placing firm orders.. Sellers were requested give at 
least ten days notice before shipment to the Inspection could 
Agency indicating the place where the goods/be inspected and the 
expected time of shipment. After•completion pf the inspection 
the .Inspection Agency would issue a report of findings which 
would either be a clear report of findings if the inspection 
I s I yielded a satisfactory result or a^non-negotiable report of 
findings if the inspection revealed discrepancies. 
\ f ' I ' 
E.C, 24/72 also gives details of a new combined 
\ \ I 
import and foreign exchange allocation licence application form, 
(previously the two licences had to be applied for separately 
and this''has been'blamed for some of the administrative delays) y ' u. 4 
^' The exceptional are:- Imports by Government ministries for 
which special arrangements exist, ii) Imports by the E.A.C, and 
its corporations i'ii) Imports from Tanzania and Uganda, iv) When 
the invoice lvalue doss not exceed 2,000/- v) Transactions not 
involving the provision of foreign .exchange from Kenya at any time 
(e.g., gifts) \H.) goods imported as a means of capital formation 
on a loan account basis which receive a special treatment following 
preshipment submission of the details of the consignment by the 
importer. Trie Inspection Agency woold decide whether or hot to issue 
a Clean Report of Findings and whether or not it was considered 
necessary fbr thpn to inspect the consignment. 
- IS 
which was to be completed in sextuplicate in respect of each 
category of imports under Schedules A C and D and other items i • 
under 0 G L not included in Schedules D and E. Completed applica-
tions would be forwarded to the Director of Trade and Supplies 
accompanied by one copy of the sellers proforma invoice or indent 
recording amongst other things the quantity, quslity and description 
of goods, and the f o b and c i f price. The Director of Trade 
and Supplies would enclose the application where provided with 
the appropriate details for import licensing, no objection to 
foreign exchange certificate or 0 G L and forward five copies 
to the Central Bank with a copy of the proforma invoice. 
The original, duplicate and triplicate applications would be 
returned to the Director of Trade and Supplies for delivery to 
the importer who would retain the original and duplicate until 
payment was due to be made or otherwise required by his bankers. 
The triplicate copy is for Customs Clearance. The fourth copy 
of the application and the supoorting invoice retained by 
Exchange Centrol would be forwarded when necessary to the General 
Superintendence Co.Ltd., in the country where the inspection 
was to take place. It is hoped that this will streamline 
the administration of the teystem as a whole. 
B. The effects of import restrictions^ 
Making the small country assumption that the economy 
faces on import supply curve of infinite elasticity and assuming 
competition among domestic consumers, domestic producers, 
L \ 
importers and foreign suppliers, then we can draw the 
! \ , , • 
aggregate demand curve for a good (D D*J which is produced 
both domestically and imported in the diaaram fig 1 . 
/ S ".-£) 
Customs Officials have observed a\marked increase in the number 
qfo^fionsigments of just below 2,000 shillings-since-the -new..scheme. 
was'introduced! 
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With no restrictions on- imports then the local price is the 
world price 0 P. Local production is 0 q determined by 
the intersection of the supply curve for local producers S S with 
the world supply curve P P. Total consumption of the good 
is 0' Q and imports are- q Q, 
If imports are restricted by the imposition of a volume 
quota to 50°/o of their free trade level and prices are freely flexible, 
then the domestic price rises. Imports at the.new level are 
a L * q' Q', local production increase, to 0 q1, total consumption 
falls to 0 0', and the domestic price rises to 0 P'. If licences 
are awarded to the extent of the quota to domestic traders than 
they will obtain a margin above normal profit equal to the 
shaded area in figure 1. These excess profits are rents since 
they reflect the scarcity value of licences and are greater 
the more inelastic the demand for the good over the relevant 
r*ange. 
A tariff levied at the rate P* would have had 
^ P 0 
the same effect on the import bill except that the tariff would 
have yielded customs revenues instead of increased traders margins. 
It would also have had the same protective effect on local 
industry by causing import prices to rise. In this section we 
.will be looking at what happens when we relax tnese simplifying 
'assumptions and how relevant the alternative theoretical deductions 
' are to the Kenyan situation. 
In Kenya licensed items are also subject to tariffs. 
The extreme right hand columns of the tables in Appendix B 
indicate that the average level of tariff on licensed goods is 
higher than the average for imports-as-a whole. In 1971 licensed 
items accounted for around one fifth of total net home consumption 
but acounted for more than half of all duty collected. The affect 
of a tariff is to sypho.n off at least some of the excess profit 
otherwise earned by traders. If the margin between the domestic 
price and the world price is greater then the tariff than it is the 
quota which sets the internal price, and if the tariff is higher then 
it sets the price. Even where a quota is redundant it may have 
The theoretical parts of'this secticn draw heavily on Cordon's 
treatment of the subject, in : WM Corden: "The Theory 
of Effective Protection." Oxford 19?1. 
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a purpose in ensuring that imports are reduced at least 
to a certain amount in case the tariff is inadequate. In such 
cases it acts as an insurance against dumping. 
Following the imposition of import restrictions it 
is conceivable that total traders' profits may fall causing 
imports to cease because their turnover is reduced. Where licences 
are transferrable, and there is a market for them, some traders 
may buy the liceces of others. The decline in imports means 
the demand for traders services declines, but total normal 
profits also decline became there are fewer firms. The quota 
profits go to all firms receiving licences including the firms 
that go out of business as proceeds for the sale of their 
liceces. 
In Kenya the transfer of licecnces is illegal and deyious 
would only be able, to proceed through [_'" means. It is 
difficult, however, to find evidence of importers actually 
going out of business after receiving licence allocations 
because their post-restriction turnover is too low for them to 
make even normal profits. If this did happen it would mean that 
imports would fall by more than the extent of the restrictions. 
Where monopolies either among traders or local 
producers previously existed or emerge as a result of the restriction 
a number of alternatives are possible. If the trader was a profit 
maximizing monopolist before the imposition of the restriction 
he is forced to move from his profit maximizing position. 
With value quotas the domestic price rises as the value of imports 
declines. (in the case of volume quotas the value of imports 
may increase where the elasticity of- demand is less than unity 
depending on the elasticity of supply)."1 If the monopolist 
.rising ,curve was moving along the£ part of his average cost L so that 
the reduction in imports lowers unit costs, the profit per unit 
of imports must rise. The reduced profits he is making depend 
on the quota so that what were monopoly profits are now quota 
profits. If the monopolist was on the falling part of his 
Most Kenyan licence restrictions that are not absolute 
bans on competing imports are value ..quotas relating to past 
performance in some base year. 
\ 
I I I 
t 
/ / 
/ 
- 21 -
avgrage~coat>~cLrrva^- - a • ne-resolt—of—the— 
restriction, his profits could disappear and he might run into 
a loss. 
It is difficult to guage the extent of monopoly amongst 
traders in Kenya. The last published Survey of Distribution 
was for 1930. Since then two further studies were undertaken, 
for 1957 and 1968, but the Statistical Division considered them 
to be too unreliable to publish. Thus we have no ready means 
of assessing the degree of oomoul^tillan or the extent to which this 
has changed in recent years for the sector as a whole or for 
particular parts of it; "Since most of the import-export houses 
are private companies and are therefore not obliged to publish their 
accounts it is not possible to ascertain details of capital employed 
2 
or turnover on which to base any list in order of size" . 
Many licenced commodities are imported by large international 
companies. Textiles however, are handled by a large number of 
importers (mainly K.N.T.C, agents) including local manufacturers. 
Quantitative restrictions themselves may turn a group 
of competitive traders into a monopoly or cartel. This is possible 
in Kenya where restrictions set up a barrier to new entrants 
by confining quotas to existing importers. The establishment erf 
a monopoly might make no difference at all if the volume which would 
maximize profits in the absence of the quota were greater than 
the quota level. In this case the value of imports, domestic and 
foreign prices' etc., would all be set by the quota as in the 
competitive.c^se. If. profit maximizing imports are less than the 
quota level, however, some licences will remain unsued. 
Ih a situation, where a local producers monopoly exists 
• but there is Competition among traders, consumers and exporters 
/ ( i.e., so as to avoid situations of bilateral monopoly) local 
production jnay;rise or fall following the imposition of the restrictions. 
In figure 2 D D' is the domestic demand curve for a good which 
i j \. 
, / is produced both locally and imported, and C C is the local 
monopolists marginal cost curve. ^ 
V v , 
2. " 
"Who controls industry in Kenya?" . Report of a working party, 
p.53. East African Publishing House 1968. 
\ 
\ . '. .. .••.••• '''I1' • 
- 22 
~X> 
Under free trade local production is 0 q, local 
consumption is 0 Q with imports of q 0, When the quota is 
imposed limiting imports to L Q the demand curve facing the 
monopolist,is the composite curve D" A B D*. A marginal revenue 
curve, M R, can be drawn for the relevant portion of the 
composite demand curve, D" A, and local production is determined 
by the point of intersection of this curve with this monopolist's 
marginal cost curve. This may be to the right or left of the 
point of intersection of the monopolists marginal cost curve with 
the original import supply curve and thus profit maximizing 
output may be above or below that which pertained in the free 
trade situation. The smaller the quota the more the composite 
demand curve and its associated marginal revenue curve are to 
the right and hence the more likely it is that output increases. 
In figure 2 local production falls to 0 a' following the 
introduction of the restriction and the domestic price rises 
to 0 P' . 
Foreign exporters may do their own importing into 
the country so that there are no separate trading firms. 
In this case the. terms of trade will deteriorate with licensing 
since the quota profits go abroad. If the quota was on volume 
and the elasticity of demand for the good was less than unity, 
the value of imports would actually rise. If the quota was 
on value but the elasticity of demand initially less than unity 
then reducing the volume imported would at first raise the 
value of imports. The value would remain higher than before as 
the volume was further reduced until the elasticity of demand 
exceeded unity. In this way markedly large reductions in import 
volumes might occur for a given valyc quota reduction. 
A situation which is particularly rlevant to Kenya 
is where licences are awarded tp foreign owned trading firms 
operating domestically. The quota profits will go abroad 
or at least be credited to foreigners just as if the licences 
had been awarded to exporters only the quota profits will take the 
form of invisible instead of visible imports. 
The quota profits could gO'to the government if it 
chose to" auction licences" off to the highest bidder. This method 
of tapping the excess profit breaks down when there are monopolistic 
elements in the import traded which prevent competitive bidding. 
The situation is then one of bilateral monopoly in which case 
a fixed licence fee would be more practicable, 
Most of the larger and medium sized manufacturing 
firms in Kenya do their own importing directly rather than through 
\ \ 
intermediary wholesalers. In the event of restrictions 
on imported imports it is they who receive the notional quota 
\ 
profits. In cases where an import'restriction persists, if the 
producer is a monopolist he will have been maximizing his profits 
before the quota restriction was imposed so his profits are reduced 1, 
with the restriction. If he was operating on the falling part 
of his cost curve originally his profits may disappear completely 
and he may go out of business. The case is the same where an 
industry is perfectly competitive with each fim facing a horizontal 
demand curve. If the industry is competitive and faces a demand 
curve of less than infinite elasticity, however, the enforced 
reduction in output may bring it closer to the output level which 
the industry would choose if it were monopolized, in which case 
profits would rise. Profits would also rise if the input i 
restriction acted as a barier to entry into the industry enabling 
firms to make monopoly profits at loweip levels of output so that 
some licences would remain unused. j 
• i 
In the Kenyan situation restrictions on the use of 
imported inputs would not have this effect since they are only 
used to encourage the use of locally produced substitutes instead I 
of imports. In this case input prices might rise if the locally 
produced itrem is more expensive but cases of inpu-fc-s+iorfcogeG -soting-
as a long run constraint on final output-should not happen. . v I • / / >•'"' 
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criticism 
A major/i"1"—• rof using quontitative restrictions 
instead of tariffs to restrict imports is that tariffs perform the 
same functions as quantitative restrictions"^ onlv the criiiioiem 
earn much needed customs revenues. This / is only 
applicable to a fraction of those .items that are subject to 
licencing in Kenya; namely those whose imports continue but 
Cerden ( op cit ) discusses the exceptions to this rule. 
A "comparable tariff" (i.e. one which yields the same 
reduction in import volume as the quota) may not exist 
if the trader, exporter or useS is a monoDolist. 
If he is operating on the declining"portion of his cost 
curve the restriction raises unit costs which may reduce 
quota profits to zero. If a tariff is imposed"instead 
he will make a loss operating at the quota level so no 
tariff will induce him to import at this point. If a 
comparable tariff does exist it will lead to a larger 
reduction in the value of imports than a quota if exporters 
are obtaining the quota profits. 
If there is a potential domestic producers monopoly 
a non-prohibitive tariff does not have the same monopoly 
creating effect as a quota but shares with it the import 
replacing, effect. A given reduction in imports when 
achieved by a tariff will be associated with a greater rise 
in domestic output than when achieved by quota ( in which 
case these might actually be a fall in domestic output) 
Hence it must be achieved with a lesser fall in domestic 
consumption compared with a quota and therefore a smaller 
rise in domestic prices is required. If a newly created 
monopoly restricts imports below the level set by the quota 
the comparable tariff rate is not that which attains 
the level of imports.permitted by the quota but that which 
attains the lower actual level, 
If there is price rigidity the tariff will raise 
prices by more than the quota. If ^he users of the restricted 
intermediate goods obtain licences their import prices 
will not rise as they would have done had a tariff been 
imposed. 
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at a reduced level than before the imposition of restrictions Commodities 
entering Kenya under specific import licence quotas before E.S. 1/72 include 
a number of food items tyres and tubes, some textiles passing through K.N.T.C. 
and a few small manufacturos, During the past year those items appearing on 
Schedule C of E.C. 1/72 and not mentioned above would also be included. 
Price range restrictions usually involve the banning of competing 
imports allowing imports above a specified price to continue unrestricted, 
A banned import is equivalent to a prohibitive tariff, which would earn no 
customs revenue in any case. 
A licence auction, to recoup lost potential government revenues 
from customs duties, would be impractical for many items because of monopoly 
elements among local traders. As an .alternative traders could be charged 
fees to import certain items under quotas where it was thought excess profits 
were being made. These could bo raised or lowered to regulate the level of 
imports. Another method would be for the Director of Trade and Supplies 
to monopolise- all the imports of particular commodities and then to sell to 
wholesalers and retailers. The way the K.N.T.C• operates by appointing 
wholesalers who act as agents and pay a commission for the privilege syphons 
off some of the quota profits which would otherwise have gone to private traders. 
The K.N.T.C, could be a vehicle for reducing trader^ surpluses in certain 
cases by increasing its commission on licence quotasy But if the quotas 
had their intended effect of stimulating the growth of potentially efficient 
sectors quota profits should not be large so it might not "be worthwhile 
1 \ setting up the revenue collecting machinery. 
It is also possible for some or all of the profits to go to "brief-
case importers" who charge a commission for the use of the licences they have 
been granted but do not engage in importing themselves. This need not be illegal 
if it can be shown that at least on paper the goods have passed through their 
hands.^ 
" j ' 
It is also possible to limit traders quote profits using the powers conferred 
under the Price Control Act (Cap 504), The effectiveness of these measures 
varies tremendously between commodities, -
2. Phelps claims this to have happened in Kenya with cqses of African importers 
acting as little more than nominal agents for Asians/ who pay the Africans 
a commission. See M G Phelps: "Import licensing irr Kenya an interim 
report", May 1970. 
/ 
The of civil servants is always a possibility when potential 
profits.are high so that some quota profits may be d 
in this way. 
The Government may introduce price control to prevent 
the price of. the restricted import from rising to that with a given 
foreign supply price there will be no quota profits. If traders' 
average costs rise as a result of the restriction they may be in 
difficulties and imports might even cease. If this does not 
happen, either because costs do not rise or some rise in price is 
allowed to enable them to maintain normal profits, consumers are 
better off than if the quota profits had gone to traders, exporters 
or government but were off than in, the free market situation because 
their choice has been restricted. Some manufacturers maintain 
that Kenyan consumers have an irrational preference for imported 
over locally produced goods and that in many cases the local 
product is just as good. Even if thiswere true it does not 
alter the fact that consumers are worse off if we define being better 
off as a situation where more of a consumer's desires are 
satisfied. It is possible though for consumers' desires to 
change after they are forced to try the local substitute. 
Prices may be rigid in the face of shortages. 
Traders may be long term profit maximizers and wish to maintain 
goodwill with their customers rather than take advantage of what 
may only be a temporary restriction. In view of the Minister's 
announcement this could well be happening in Kenya. The traders 
may also be reluctant to capitalise on the changed situation 
for fear of government reprisals. 
A second body of criticism of the licensing syfetem 
concerns administrative difficulties. When only a small 
number of licencing officers have to process all the licence 
applications there are bound to be delays. 
I 
Price control would need to be carried all the way 
along the claim of distribution to the consumer to prevent 
middlemen cashing in on the quota profits, 
i 
Until recently there was only one licencing officer for the 
whole of Kenya. with the increase in the number of items 
the Department was asked to handle following E.C. 1/72, 
three more licencing officers were appointed. Because of the 
most recent extension of the system to include all imports 
of more than,<£,000 shs. an additional two or three more 
officers may be appointed making an evential total of six or 
seven. 
An import licence is valid for -bur months. There have been 
cases where licences have expirel before the processing 
was completed so that the importers have had to reapply. 
Delays in the grantirg of licences can be costly. 
One firm was interviewed which imported wire rod from week to 
week but it takes two to three weeks for an application to import 
rod from this firm to bp processed. The price variation is 
about five percent so if manufacturers are unable to exploit 
favourable world price situations and place firm orders with 
foreign suppliers except after some delay; increases in material 
costs of as much as ^ive per cent must be tolerated. 
Firms can also be expected to increase the level of 
stocks of goods likely to be subject to licensing delays, 
thus raising overhead costs. At the same time fluctuations 
in stock levels might be reduced because of the increased 
difficulties in rebuilding run down stock at short notice. 
However, direct evidence of this happening in Kenya is 
difficult to find. 
Blanket restrictions on the importation of certain 
S.I.T.C. groupings have had to be amended to allow for imports 
of specific items. These ere only to be expected when the system 
includes such a wide range of goods. Where a manufacturer is 
refused a licence to import a necessary input but is unable to find 
a suitable locally produced equivalent he must first approach 
the manufacturers of the product range to which the item belongs 
and present the authorities with written confirmation from him that^ 
the item is not produced in Kenya. This happened in the case' of 
a handbag manufacturer who was unable to obtain handbag"fastenings 
following the introduction of restri-trtions on^the importing of 
padlocks because handbag fasteJings and lacks are included in the 
-
same S.I.T.Cc six digit grouping (598 110). "These things take 
time to sort out and production may easily be disrupted Ir». the 
/ ' s process. 
Manufacturers have seldom received advanced notice 
of pending restrictions. One manufacturer had recently - - / 
imported a stapling machine for packaging purposes when imports/ 
of staples were restricted. Although Joe eventually obtained 
permission to continue importing staples, which,were of a kind 
not manufactured locally, he clair*s-to.;ha've lost business because 
he was unable to despatch jprrters while -h-is packaging- plant was 
out of action. 
The main problems the Department faces in administering 
the scheme are smuggling and wrong identification of consign-
ments. There have been cases of goods being redirected through 
1 
Partner states as well as simple illegal direct importation. 
If the licensing system' is to work well it is important that the 
administrators should be competent p ersonna 1 with an understanding 
of the items they are restricting. It could be argued that these 
are the type of people who are in heavy demand elsewhere and that 
the system is wastefuily labour intensive. Textiles have proved 
to be a particularly difficult area. The licensing officers' 
knowledge of the nature of the items coming under their jurisdiction 
is improving through time and the technical specifications of 
licensed items has become more refined, (e.g. Suiting material is 
of a different weight and width than dress material and this can 
be specified in the description of the restricted item). 
As. the licensing officers became more experienced it is expected 
that the number of difficult cases and anomali® will be reduced. 
But these will never disapoear entirely. With technological 
advancement and when the demands of the domestic economy are 
constantly changing they will be constantly faced with fresh • V . t i 
problems. The licensing officer cannot be a specialist in everything 
he has to handle. 
The way in which goods are restricted can also be 
criticised. Pries range restrictions are undesirable on welfare 
grounds. Only the cheaper items are affected which discriminates 
against the poor. The value of imparts may also increase in 
total if consumers switch to slightly more expensive foreign 
products rather than buy the cheaper domestically produced equivalent. 
Although foreign exchango smuggling through over pricing indents 
/ could occur in any case price range restrictions provide a direct 
inducement to importers to do this. On certain items customs 
officials have noticed marked increases in the numbers of items 
imported in the price range immediately above the restricted range. 
This could be an honest response to the effects of the restriction, 
i.e. consumers prefering to buy the more,expensive import 
rather than the cheaper local substitute, or an indication of 
false pricing of imports. 
Of course smuggling is a:problem with tariffs as well. 
- kz 
Phelps" quotes an example where the Industrial Section 
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry decided to check on the 
imports of radios. No licences.were issued to import two band 
sets costing less than 1.30/- each, but a large proportion (50}; to 
7£P/o} of imports were in the price range 130/- to 140/- and 
particular models were priced differently on different importers 
indents. If the licensing officers checked for the possibility 
that importers were giving false price information so as to evade 
the 'restriction it was possible that the importers were over-
invoicing, Checking the retail prices of goods is not very 
satisfactory because of the difficulty in estimating retailers 
margins and of finding out the actual retail price given 
the prevalent practice of special discounts. Investigators 
found foreign sets of twe bands selling in Nairobi at 150/- retail. 
There is a customs duty of 50& on radios so that a radio priced 
at 130./- c.i.f. Mombasa should not have sold in Nairobi for 
under 200/-, Mo indents were passed which were obviously 
contradicting instructions during the year of the investigation 
90 there is a strong suspicion of over-invoicing, (although 
we cannot over took the possibility that the sets were old stock 
sold off cheaply), 
Because of the difficulties associated with price including 
range restrictions^the need to constantly update them 
by raising threshold prices in order for them to achieve their 
intended effect, it has been suggested that price range restrictions 
.. should bs replaced by simple value quotas to importers equal to 
the value of the imports of the higher priced varieties of the 
particular item which have hitherto been allowed in. But if this 
we're- done the restriction need not necessarily have the intended I -
effect. Taking.radios as ah example; If total imports of radios 
were around 400,000 shillings with sales' of locally produced radios 
under price range protection a further 200,000 shillings, then ! t ' 
after the policy change importers would receive quotas amounting 
to 400,000 shillings in total. Given the freedom to choose: 
which radios to import their choice will be governed by the 
relative profitability of continuing to import only the higher 
priced sets or importing over the whole product'-ranae. Prior to 
t i 
the policy change only normal trading profits would be made on 
i; 
the more expensive sets (assuming traders were competitive with 7e another). 
r 
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Relaxing the ban on the import of cheaper sets gives traders 
the opportunity to make higher profits to the extent by which 
the domestic price of locally made sets exceeds the equivalent 
world price. This will of course be greater the less efficient 
and more monopolised the local industry. The effect of the 
profit change will be to equalise the rate of profit on importing 
(will be lowered but will not disappear entirely while quota profits 
all radio sets. The effective tariff to local manufacturers^ 
will be made on all sets. A sliding tariff with higher rates 
on imports competing with locally made items is subject to 
the same weakness of finding the "right" local price to be 
protected. By reducing the relative price differential between 
high and low quality alternatives demand for the lower quality 
item falls while that for the more expensive substitute rises. 
The local manufacturer loses sales to higher quality imports 
and the import bill sufferss If local radio manufacturers must 
be protected the only way to avoid administrative difficulties 
and passible abuses of price range controls is to have a uniform 
tariff across the whole product range high enough to give local 
manufacturers the required protection. But the cost of this 
is of course to raise the domestic price level even further. 
Quantitative restrictions are generally related to 
past performance in a base year which makes it difficult to Afriea-
nizc trade. Furthermore, since licences arr non-transferrable 
the more efficient businesses are unable to expand at the expense 
of the less efficient except by devious means. Thus importers 
margins will be higher on average but not only because of the 
quata profits that are being made but also because unit costs are 
on average higher, 
Has a licensing system anything to redeem it? 
Determinancy is one justification. If it is desirable that 
imports be prevented from exceeding a certain value, a quota up to 
the maximum limit is a surer way of doing this than is a tariff. 
When foreign exchange reserves are running at a dangerously low level, 
